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INTRODUCTION 
Judged by laws alone, India has among the world‘s most progressive measures in place 
to tackle violence against women.  Since 1993, India has had a National Human Rights 
Commission with a broad mandate to investigate all human rights abuses.
1
  India also has a 
National Commission for Women whose job specifically includes curbing abuse against women, 
and at the heart of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Articles of India‘s 1950 Constitution 
are clauses banning discrimination on grounds of sex and establishing a secular republic founded 
on principles of equality and fundamental human rights.
2
  Moreover, India is a signatory of the 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Quinnipiac University; J.D. 2005 University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 
2001 Cornell University.  I would like to thank Wynn Gadkar-Wilcox for his effort and assistance in revising this article as 
well as the editorial board of JLASC for their insightful suggestions and comments. 
1 See Vijayashri Sripati, India’s National Human Rights Commission: A Shackled Commission?, 18 B.U. 
INT‘L L.J. 1, 12-13 (2000) (―[T]he Commission has essentially four roles to play—protector, advisor, monitor and 
educator of human rights.  The Commission has a two-pronged mission—one urgent, in order to investigate and 
recommend remedies for immediate wrongs, and another, more measured, to strive for the development of a human rights 
culture.‖). 
2 INDIA CONST. art. 14, cl. 1, art. 15, cls. 1, 3, art. 16, cls. 1-2; see Subrata Paul, Combating Domestic 
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Convention of Elimination of Violence against Women (CEDAW), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which promotes the economic rights of women.
3
  Despite these legal 
remedies, however, India‘s progressive laws prohibiting violence against women remain largely 
unenforced, and prevailing institutional and cultural disincentives for women to report incidents 
of violence remain.
4
  The unrealistic and ambitious breadth of current legal mandates protecting 
women from spousal abuse—particularly against violence related to the payment of dowries— 
creates dilemmas for agencies and officers attempting to enforce such broad measures.
5
  The 
result is commissions that are charged with ensuring the enforcement of these laws have become 
burdened by large mandates and shackled by lack of practical authority to implement or enforce 
their findings.
6
 
Numerous legal scholars have established and commented on the futility of Indian 
organizations, such as the Indian National Human Rights Commission and National Commission 
on Women, in making inroads into the basic cultural presumptions and biases that lead to an 
entrenched problem of spousal abuse in India.
7
  Few legal scholars, however, have made use of a 
number of sociological and anthropological studies that suggest that the problems of spousal 
                                                          
Violence Through Positive International Action in the International Community and in the United Kingdom, India, and 
Africa, 7 CARDOZO J. INT‘L & COMP. L., 227, 237 (1999). 
3 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; see also AMNESTY INT‘L, INDIA: THE BATTLE AGAINST FEAR AND DISCRIMINATION: 
THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN UTTAR PRADESH AND RAJASTHAN (2001), available at 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3b83b6f17.pdf; Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law 
Progress Through International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 259, 282 (2011) (finding that the primary 
international instruments for domestic violence prevention include ICCPR, IESCR, and CEDAW, all of which ―have the 
force of justiciable law‖); Pami Vyas, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in India: Economic Abuse and the Need for 
Broad Statutory Interpretation to Promote Women’s Fundamental Rights, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 177, 197 (2006). 
4 See AMNESTY INT‘L, supra note 3, at 17-18 (discussing the unwillingness of local police to take up cases 
of violence against lower caste women in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan especially against upper caste members); Laurel 
Remers Pardee, The Dilemma of Dowry Deaths: Domestic Disgrace or International Human Rights Catastrophe?, 13 
ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 491, 502 (1996) (finding that gender discrimination is perpetuated by a patriarchal society that 
―condition[s] women to expect abuse and endure it‖); Vijayashri Sripati, Human Rights in India—Fifty Years After 
Independence (1947-1997), 26 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 93, 132-33 (1997) (discussing the continuing deference to 
―personal religious laws‖ over women‘s rights); Vyas, supra note 3, at 182 (finding that many rights, including gender 
equality, fail to be actualized or adequately enforced). 
5 See Kirsten K. Davis, Equal Protection for Women in India and Canada: An Examination and 
Comparison of Sex Equality Provisions in the Indian and Canadian Constitutions, 13 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 31, 66 
(1996) (contrasting the extensiveness of protections for women against the superficiality of enforcement); Sripati, supra 
note 1, at 12-13 (discussing the broad investigational and educational mandate of the National Human Rights 
Commission). 
6 See Sripati, supra note 1, at 16-17 (discussing the National Human Rights Commission‘s mandate to 
spread literacy, do research, conduct seminars, and work with the media but decrying the fact that commissions like the 
NHRC are ―deviously designed—deliberately deprived of crucial powers—even if vested with a broad mandate‖). 
7 See Angela K. Carlson-Whitley, Dowry Death: A Violation of the Right to Life Under Article Six of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 637, 645-46 (1994) (noting that legislation 
has been ineffective in deterring dowry deaths); Davis, supra note 5, at 33 (noting that religious customs prevent the full 
enforcement of equal rights guarantees in the Indian Constitution); Paul, supra note 2, at 237 (noting that the equal rights 
guarantees in the Indian Constitution are not yet backed up by state action); Sripati, supra note 1, at 16 (―[T]he state and 
its agents (police and the armed forces) are the biggest human rights violators.‖). 
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violence may be intertwined with economic status and class discrimination, particularly when 
economics are mixed with the social stigma of caste.
8
  Domestic violence, these studies suggest, is 
particularly pervasive in rural areas in India and disproportionately affects the poorest classes and 
castes of women, since women of lower class status and from rural areas have the least access to 
information about their rights.
9
  Despite progressive legal reforms, statutes addressing dowry 
violence and spousal abuse remain unenforced for the majority of rural and lower caste women 
because these women cannot overcome the combined effects of deep-seated presumptions about 
both their gender and class status.
10
  Recognizing that the intersection of gender and class 
discrimination is at the heart of the problem of domestic violence is a necessary step to solving 
the problem of the lack of enforcement of laws criminalizing gender-based violence. 
I. INDIAN LEGAL PROTECTIONS FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A. Protections in Indian Constitutional Law 
Although the Indian judicial system is largely modeled after the English common law 
system, India also incorporates the doctrine of judicial review, which enables the court to review 
the constitutionality of legislative statutes.
11
  The practice of statutory interpretation primarily 
involves textual analysis, legislative intent, historical and contextual analysis, and examination of 
case law in order to reveal the intention and meaning of a statute.
12
 
This discretionary power has enabled courts to establish broad constitutional protections.  
Because Indian constitutional law has a strong human rights and antidiscrimination component, 
there are, in theory, substantive legal protections in place to prevent the discrimination of women.  
Some of these laws date back to efforts by the British colonial government to eliminate the 
practice of sati (the immolation of widows) and to ensure that widows were entitled to property.
13
  
                                                          
8 See Diane Mitsch Bush, Women’s Movements and State Policy Reform Aimed at Domestic Violence 
Against Women: A Comparison of the Consequences of Movement Mobilization in the U.S. and India, 6 GENDER & SOC‘Y 
587, 600 (1992) (noting that Indian feminists have stressed the need to consider issues of gender violence together with 
class and caste violence); L. Gerstein, In India, Poverty and Lack of Education Are Associated with Men’s Physical and 
Sexual Abuse of Their Wives, 26 INT‘L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 44, 44-45 (2000) (arguing that low economic status leads to 
greater abuse); Dorothy Stein, Burning Widows, Burning Brides: The Perils of Daughterhood in India, 61 PAC. AFFAIRS 
465, 477 (1988) (noting that urbanization, westernization, education, and wealth have effected changes in the actual 
workings of both dowry and marriage systems). 
9 See JOANNA LIDDLE & RAMA JOSHI, DAUGHTERS OF INDEPENDENCE: GENDER, CASTE, AND CLASS IN 
INDIA 38 (1986) (suggesting that legislation for women‘s equality fails because rural women do not have access to 
education and therefore are unaware of their legal rights); see also Bina Agarwal, Widows Versus Daughters or Widows as 
Daughters? Property, Land, and Economic Security in Rural India, 32 MODERN ASIAN STUD. 1, 42 (1998) (suggesting 
that women‘s inheritance rights and land claims might be taken more seriously if there were a greater presence women‘s 
organizations that could provide rural women with access to lawyers, legal advice, and information). 
10 See Anuradha Saibaba Rajesh, Women in India: Abysmal Protection, Peripheral Rights and Subservient 
Citizenship, 16 NEW ENG. INT‘L & COMP. L. ANN. 111, 112 (2010) (finding that regional, cultural, class, caste, education, 
religious, and community variations result in differential levels and experiences of violence, exploitation, and abuse). 
11 NORMAN D. PALMER, THE INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 128 (1961). 
12 Vyas, supra note 3, at 181. 
13 See Hindu Widow‘s Re-Marriage Act, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 1856, § 2, 4 (1) 1856 (allowing Hindu 
widows to legally remarry if they forfeit the right to the property inherited from her husband); Hindu Women‘s Right to 
Property Act, 1937, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 1937 (giving Hindu women the limited right to inherit their husband‘s 
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Upon the promulgation of the new Constitution of an independent India in 1950, further 
substantial protections were added in the form of Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Indian 
Constitution, which together come under Part III‘s Fundamental Rights section entitled Right to 
Equality.
14
  These sections of the Indian Constitution seem to guarantee basic rights to equality 
embodied in Article 14‘s guarantee that ―[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality before 
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.‖
15
  The addition of a new 
section to Article 15 by the Constitution Act of 1951, furthermore, makes explicit that the 
guarantee of basic rights does not limit the Indian government from enacting special provisions to 
aid women or those with lower economic or social standing in attaining equality: ―Nothing in this 
article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for 
the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.‖
16
  This amendment has led to a strong presumption 
that the State should redress existing inequalities, since ―[e]quality before the law means that 
equals should be treated equally, but unequals should not be treated equally.‖
17
 
The Indian Constitution also recognizes the international obligations incurred by virtue 
of being a signatory to CEDAW and ICESCR, both of which promote the economic equality of 
women.
18
  CEDAW broadly defines discrimination against women as ―any distinction, exclusion 
or restriction made on the basis of sex,‖ which serves to impair the fundamental human rights in 
the political, economic, social, cultural or civic fields.
19
  ICESCR guarantees the right of self-
determination and equality of opportunity.
20
 
B. Protections in Indian Penal Law 
In addition to the fundamental rights of equality articulated by the Indian Constitution, 
India has on several occasions amended the Indian penal code to reflect the need for more specific 
statutes to address problems of violence against women.
21
 
In 2005, India passed the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 
(PWDVA).
22
  The act ―aims to expand existing definitions of domestic violence to include verbal, 
emotional, sexual, and economic abuse, and allows women civil and/or criminal redress for 
                                                          
estate with the caveat that such an estate would revert back to the husband‘s heirs upon her death). 
14 See INDIA CONST. art. 14 (assuring that no person should be denied equality before the law), id. art. 15 cl. 
1, (assuring that the state shall not discriminate on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth), id. art. 16, cl. 1 
(ensuring equality of opportunity); Davis, supra note 5, at 37 (noting that these Articles form the heart of India‘s 
constitution and provide important fundamental rights). 
15 INDIA CONST. art. 14. 
16 INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 4. 
17 S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 29, 61 (2001).   
18 See Vyas, supra note 3, at 196 (finding that the Indian Constitution references India‘s obligations under 
international law). 
19 CEDAW, supra note 3, at art. 1. 
20 See Vyas, supra note 3, at 198 (―To comply with its international obligations under ICESCR, India must 
ensure that a woman has the right to work and the right to determine her economic security through self-actualization.‖). 
21 Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 644-45; Madhu Kishwar, Laws Against Domestic Violence: Underused 
or Abused?, MANUSHI, no. 120, 2000, at 17, 19-22. 
22 The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12. 
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violations of the Act.‖
23
 
Additionally, PWDVA allows magistrates to grant orders of protection, temporary 
compensation and housing to victims of domestic violence.
24
  The intention of the law is to 
simplify the process for making a domestic violence claim and to assist women who might find it 
difficult to leave a violent relationship.  This statute has the benefit of being far more expansive 
than prior legislation.  Nevertheless, difficulties in enforcing PWDVA have followed the pattern 
of prior expansive laws.  In some cases, such as in Maharashtra, courts have intervened to force 
compliance at the local level.
25
 
Furthermore, PWDVA may expand the definition of domestic violence too far by 
combining it with relatively minor offenses.  In addition to more serious acts of violence, the law 
potentially criminalizes acts of ―name-calling‖ related to not having a male heir.  This part of the 
statute may have the effect of trivializing the more substantive elements of the law by 
criminalizing a single verbal act.
26
  The law also reifies the notion that women can only be 
victims, rather than perpetrators, of violence.
27
 
However, PWDVA does represent an improvement over the narrow scope of prior laws.  
Prior to the passage of that statute, India enacted several laws to tackle domestic violence, 
including the Anti-Cruelty Statute, which applies to acts of extreme cruelty, and the Anti-Dowry 
Statute, applicable in cases of violence inflicted in connection with demands for dowry.
28
 
In fact, legislative reform has been most consistently applied to cases of ―dowry death,‖ 
in which a husband or his family abuses or kills a bride in retaliation for his not having received 
sufficient dowry from the bride‘s family.
29
  In many cases, this practice can lead to particularly 
brutal murders: for instance, brides have been doused with kerosene in their kitchens and burned 
alive, with the families of the grooms later insisting that their deaths were the result of a suicide.
30
 
Concern over the continued prevalence of dowry murders in the post-independence 
period—coupled with public pressure for reform—drove new legislation instituting harsher 
punishments for dowry-related abuses or deaths.
31
  The first of a series of legislative efforts was 
the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961.  The Act codified and made explicit the definition of ―dowry‖ 
as ―any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly‖ 
                                                          
23 Vyas, supra note 3, at 179. 
24 SAUMAYA UMA, ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THROUGH THE LAW: A GUIDE TO THE PROTECTION 
OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 2005, at 110-11 (2010). 
25 Id. at 70-71 (―[T]he Bombay High Court provided directions to the Maharashtra government for an 
effective implementation‖ by appointing women as protection officers to process complaints and appointing social 
workers as service providers.). 
26 See Choudhury, supra note 3, at 299 (noting the overbreadth of the law). 
27 Id. 
28 Dowry Death, § 304B, PEN. CODE (1986); Husband or Relative of Husband of a Woman Subjecting Her 
to Cruelty, § 498A, PEN. CODE, (1983); see also Judith Greenberg, Criminalizing Dowry Death: The Indian Experience, 11 
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L, 801, 803 (2002). 
29 See Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 644-45 (discussing a series of laws that the Indian government has 
enacted to combat dowry deaths). 
30 Id. at 641; see also Stein, supra note 8, at 482 (discussing the most common forms of dowry deaths which 
involve kitchen or bathroom immolation using kerosene). 
31 See Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 645 (discussing laws by which the Indian government has made 
dowry deaths punishable by imprisonment between seven years and life); see also Pardee, supra note 4, at 500 (discussing 
the insufficiency of a series of laws designed to remedy dowry deaths). 
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either by one party of the marriage to another, or by any other person; or by the parents or any 
other person to either party or any other person.
32
 
The Act also provided a penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of six months and a 
maximum of two years for demanding a dowry.
33
  The Act was amended twice, in 1984 and 1986, 
in an attempt to close loopholes.  The amendments required police and local magistrates to 
investigate suspicious deaths of brides after marriage.  The 1986 amendment also revised the 
Indian Penal Code to require a minimum imprisonment of seven years and a maximum sentence 
of life imprisonment for those involved in dowry deaths.
34
  In addition, the Indian Evidence Act 
was amended to presume that a dowry death occurs whenever evidence indicates that a bride has 
been subjected to harassment or cruelty in relation to a dowry shortly before her death.
35
 
While the Indian government has focused its efforts to eliminate violence against women 
on the problem of dowry deaths, over time, amendments to the Indian Penal Code have also 
criminalized domestic abuse unrelated to dowry disputes.
36
  In 1983, the Indian government, for 
the first time, recognized domestic violence as a specific category of crime through the 
introduction of section 498A into the Indian Penal Code, outlawing ―a husband or relative of a 
husband . . . subjecting [a woman] to cruelty.‖
37
  In addition, 498A provides a punishment of up to 
three years for such an action. 
Because of the seemingly strict punishments prescribed by section 498A, including 
making it a non-compoundable offense, which means that an accusation triggers immediate arrest 
of the perpetrator and cannot be easily withdrawn, this section has generated considerable 
controversy.  In 2003, the Malimath Committee on Reforms of the Criminal Justice System called 
for section 498A to be amended to make the offenses bailable and compoundable in order to 
allow for the possibility of ―reconciliation.‖
38
  In reality, however, a more persuasive case can be 
made that section 498A does not go far enough.  Though PWDVA closed several loopholes in 
498A, such as extending protection to women are not formally married, PWDVA did not fix 
several other lacunae in 498A, such as the focus on adult women in relationships in the nature of 
                                                          
32 Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28 of 1961, § 2, INDIA CODE (YEAR?), vol. ??. 
33 Id. § 4. 
34 Indian Penal Code Act, No. 45 of 1860, PEN. CODE § 304B(2); see also Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 
645 (discussing laws by which the Indian government has made dowry deaths punishable by imprisonment between seven 
years and life). 
35 See Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 645 (discussing how the Indian ―Parliament amended the Indian 
Evidence Act, which now creates a presumption of dowry death whenever a woman is subjected to dowry-related cruelty 
or harassment soon before her death‖); Kishwar, supra note 21, at 115 (discussing the insertion of ―section 113B in the 
Indian Evidence Act, [in which] the lawmakers stipulated that in all those cases where a person is booked for having 
caused a ‗dowry death‘ under section 304B, the court shall presume that the accused is guilty unless he can prove 
otherwise‖). 
36 See Kishwar, supra note 21, at 112 (discussing a number of amendments that have been made to the 
Indian Penal Code in order to protect wives from marital violence); see also Laws Against Domestic Violence and Abuse, 
MANUSHI, no. 137, 2003, at 24, 24-25 (discussing legal resources for women who are victims of different forms of 
domestic violence). 
37 Indian Penal Code Act, No. 45 of 1860, PEN. CODE § 498A; see also Kishwar, supra note 21, at 114 
(discussing the introduction and parameters of § 498A of to the Indian Penal Code). 
38 1 MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOV‘T OF INDIA, COMMITTEE ON REFORMS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: REPORT 191 (2003), available at http://www.498a.org/contents/general/Malimath%20Committee_Selected 
Sections.pdf. 
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marriage, leaving abused children and domestic servants without protection.
39
 
C. Commissions Protecting Against Domestic Abuse 
Over the past two decades, the Indian government has pushed for more successful 
implementation of new domestic violence laws by founding two commissions with mandates 
related to domestic violence concerns: the National Commission for Women and the National 
Human Rights Commission.  The National Commission on Women was created by the National 
Commission for Women Act of 1990 (NCWA) and was set up as a statutory body in January 
1992.
40
  The Commission‘s mandate is chiefly to perform an investigatory and watchdog role.  Its 
main function is to look into the implementation of ―safeguards provided for women under the 
Constitution and other laws‖ and to make recommendations to the central government on how to 
improve these measures.
41
  But the Commission also has a substantial number of additional 
duties, including inspecting women‘s prisons and undertaking educational research on women‘s 
issues.
42
 
A second body, the National Human Rights Commission, has a mandate that includes 
investigating cases relating to domestic abuse.  Created in the context of a public outcry over 
rapes, tortures, and murders by police officers acting under the sweeping power of Indian 
antiterrorist legislation in the 1980s, the National Human Rights Commission was given an 
extremely broad mandate to investigate human rights violations and suggest remedies to the 
central government.
43
  This mandate includes investigation of human rights abuses, educating the 
population on human rights issues, and regularly monitoring the enforcement of human rights 
provisions in India.
44
 
II. REASONS WHY INDIAN LEGAL REMEDIES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HAVE 
BEEN INEFFECTIVE 
India‘s legislative efforts and related commissions have failed to stem the rising tide of 
domestic violence.
45
  As numerous scholars have shown, there are at least two reasons why the 
Indian government has failed to decrease abuse.  First, the unwillingness of local police to 
                                                          
39 See Tahira Karanjawala & Shivani Chugh, The Legal Battle Against Domestic Violence in India: 
Evolution and Analysis, 23 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAM. 289, 294-95 (2009) (discussing how the PWDVA is ambiguous as to 
―whether the definition of an aggrieved person would include a child‖ and ―does not make any provision for the protection 
of domestic servants‖). 
40 National Commission for Women Act, 1990, No. 20, Acts of Parliament, 1992. 
41 Id. at § 10(a)-(c). 
42 Id. at § 10(h), (k). 
43 See Sripati, supra note 1, at 8-9 (discussing how a politically turbulent time in India during the 1980s 
gave rise to the National Human Rights Commission). 
44 Id.; The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, No. 10, Acts of Parliament (1994). 
45 See Pardee, supra note 4, at 501 (discussing reasons why India‘s laws have been ineffective at reducing 
dowry murders such as, ―1) the statutes are too vague; 2) the police and the courts do not enforce the laws; and 3) social 
mores keep women subservient and docile‖); see also Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 645-46 (discussing reasons why 
the enacted Indian laws have failed in reducing dowry murders); Melissa Spatz, A “Lesser” Crime: A Comparative Study 
of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill Their Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 597, 610-11 (1991) (discussing reasons 
why the Indian government has failed to reduce dowry murders). 
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implement current legislation on domestic violence has played a major role in the inability of the 
national government to decrease violence against women.
46
  Second, deep-set cultural 
presumptions and attitudes regarding the position of women in families have also been 
impediments to reform.
47
  These two factors play a critical role in the impotence of domestic 
violence legislation, and will be considered below. A third factor, the economic disempowerment 
of women, particularly in rural areas, must also be analyzed to understand how intersections of 
caste, class, and education can create a disparate impact on women who are insufficiently 
informed about their legal rights or fail to act on them. 
A. Difficulty in Implementing Legal Protections 
The first impediment to decreasing domestic abuse in India is the impracticality of 
enforcing domestic violence laws as they are written.  Some, such as the Dowry Prohibition Act 
of 1961, are too broad in their scope.  If the definition of the dowry–‖any property‖ to be ―directly 
or indirectly‖ given or exchanged–were taken literally by the courts, then the courts would be in 
the unreasonable position of imprisoning entire wedding parties for bringing any wedding gifts at 
all.  Rather than take this untenable position, courts and law enforcement have simply declined to 
implement the law.
48
  Moving too far in the other direction, the Indian Supreme Court has 
recently declared that a demand for money by a bride‘s parents after a wedding cannot constitute 
a dowry, creating a situation in which the law is being interpreted in simultaneously over-
inclusive and under-inclusive ways.
49
  For example, only thirty-five people were charged in 
dowry death cases between January and October 1987,
50
 despite the fact that, by one estimate, one 
thousand women are burned alive annually in dowry death cases in Gujarat province alone.
51
  
Moreover, implementation does not appear to be improving over time.  Of the 131,338 crimes 
                                                          
46 See Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 648-49 (stating that police often fail to properly investigate 
domestic abuse cases); see also Indira Jaising, Domestic Violence and the Law, 1 J. NAT‘L HUM. RTS. COMM‘N, 72, 72-73 
(2002) (―[T]he role of State inaction in the perpetuation of the violence combined with the gender-specific nature of 
domestic violence require that domestic violence be classified and treated as a human rights concern rather than as a mere 
domestic criminal justice concern.‖). 
47 See Sripati, supra note 1, at 44 (discussing the indifference of the Indian central government to the actions 
and recommendations of the NHRC); Bush, supra note 8, at 601 (explaining that legal remedies for domestic violence do 
little to change or question familial power structures at the root of the domestic violence problem); Sudhir Kakar, 
Feminine Identity in India (discussing the subordinate position of women in traditional family structures), in WOMEN IN 
INDIAN SOCIETY: A READER 44, 61 (Rehana Ghadially ed., 1988). 
48 See Laws Don’t Benefit Women, STATESMAN (India), Mar. 18, 2001 (noting the lack of implementation of 
domestic violence laws); Dharam Shourie, HR Group Praises Indian Democracy, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, Jan. 17, 2002 
(noting that particularly in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, complaints of violence against dalits and women are rarely brought to 
the attention of the authorities). 
49 See Dhananjay Mahapatra, Customary Payments, Gifts not Dowry, SC, TIMES INDIA, Feb. 1, 2008, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-02-01/india/27773374_1_dowry-harassment-charges-dowry-prohibition-
act-judicial-discipline (criticizing India‘s Supreme Court ruling ―that demand for money and presents from parents of a 
married girl at the time of birth of her child or for other ceremonies, as is prevalent in society, may be deprecable  [sic] but 
cannot be categorised [sic] as dowry to make it a punishable offence‖). 
50 Namratha S. Ravikant, Dowry Deaths: Proposing a Standard for Implementation of Domestic Legislation 
in Accordance with Human Rights Obligations, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 478, 476-77 (2000) (discussing the number of 
dowry death cases). 
51 Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 643 (showing that one-thousand women are buried alive in Gujarat). 
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committed against women in 1998, thirty-one percent were perpetrated by a husband or 
relatives.
52
 
Even after the passage of PWDVA, similar problems persist.  Many of the PWDVA‘s 
provisions are still problematic and vague, and enforcement remains partial.  For example, the 
PWDVA allows judges to mandate counseling in which the victim of domestic abuse is required 
to sit in sessions with her abuser.
53
  Moreover, the statute‘s potential criminalization of ―insults‖ 
and ―ridicule‖ affords opponents of the law a means to trivialize the law in its entirety.
54
  As a 
result, the law remains largely unimplemented, since the public is largely unaware of its 
provisions and enforcement efforts remain underfunded.
55
 
Even more significantly, the Supreme Court‘s decisions indicate that laws about 
domestic violence cannot be properly enforced because a traditional mindset regarding inter-caste 
relations, gender roles, and marriage persist.  A noteworthy example of how extensively these 
mentalities are entrenched can be seen in the 2008 Indian Supreme Court case of Dilip 
Premnarayan Tiwari & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, in which the Court reviewed the appropriate 
sentence for acts of homicide motivated by issues of caste.  This case involved a Brahmin woman, 
Sushma Tiwari, whose family was from Uttar Pradesh.  Sushma married a Malayali man, Prabhu 
Nochil from the Ezhava (small cultivator) caste, against the wishes of her family.  As a result, 
Sushma‘s brother, Dilip, along with his friends, attacked the Nochil house, killing Prabhu, his 
father, his cousin, and a family friend, and severely wounding Prabhu‘s mother and sister.
56
 
In its decision, the Supreme Court found that the Mumbai High Court erred in sentencing 
the perpetrators to death because it failed to account for mitigating circumstances, including the 
violation of family honor in the case of an unsanctioned intercaste marriage. Specifically, Justice 
Sirpukar found that, for Dilip, it was ―necessary to display the loyalty to the family in whose 
house he was living and it could have been only out of that, that the murders took place.‖
57
 
In rendering such a decision, the Court justifies the idea that, contrary to the intent of 
PWDVA, prevalent cultural norms ought to be used as mitigating factors, rather than penalty-
enhancing ones.  Justice Sirpukar added that ―it is the elder brother who justifiably or otherwise is 
held responsible for not stopping‖ the inter-caste affair, and that Sushma Tiwari increased her 
family‘s animosity by refusing to drop out of college where she was ―openly mixing with the 
society.‖
58
  The Court further found that blame for the honor killing rested with Sushma not only 
for marrying Prabhu, but also for becoming pregnant and thus reaching ―a point of no return.‖
59
  
                                                          
52 See Editorial, Private Tears and Public Pain, HINDU, Jun. 6, 2001, available at http://www.hindu.com/ 
2001/06/06/stories/05062512.htm (noting that the lack of implementation of laws at the local level has led to a decreased 
confidence in the legal system among victims and ultimately to making them less likely to seek justice). 
53 Ashleigh Owens, Confronting the Challenge of Domestic Violence Sentencing Policy: A Review of the 
Increasingly Global Use of Batterer Intervention Programs, 35 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 565, 594 (2012) (discussing how 
provisions of the PWDVA are controversial such as giving judges the option of mandating that an offender attend 
counseling sessions with the victim). 
54 See Choudhury, supra note 3, at 299 (discussing how the PWDVA has been criticized because ―it is 
overbroad in its definition of verbal and emotional abuse‖). 
55 See Owens, supra note 53, at 595 (stating that the effectiveness of some provisions in the PWDVA is 
limited due to ―lack of public awareness and inadequate funding‖). 
56 Dilip Premnarayan Tiwari & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 16 S.C.R. 322. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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Accordingly, Sushma‘s breach of expected cultural norms was ―the reason why this ghastly 
episode took place.‖
60
 
This line of reasoning presumes that violence is justified as a response to a woman‘s 
failure to adhere to traditional mores and that the intersection of still-prevalent ideas of caste and 
gender superiority supersede statutory mandates.  The resulting and quite problematic paradox is 
that the Court cannot be expected to enforce laws designed to counteract cultural bias if it 
endorses a line of reasoning that justifies their blatant violation. 
Another problem of implementation stems from the reluctance of regional or local 
officials to enforce the mandates of the central government.  Police are reluctant to become 
involved in prosecuting domestic violence offenses, and prosecutors frequently refuse to take up 
these cases.
61
  In addition, state and local governments frequently balk at following up on the 
mandates of the central government.  For example, though the National Commission for Women 
put pressure on individual states to set up women‘s commissions, only a few states have done so.  
Additionally, some states lacking a state commission, such as Uttar Pradesh, are also states in 
which domestic abuse is most serious.
62
  Efforts to delay implementation are heightened by the 
genuine backlog in the dockets of many Indian courts resulting from a lack of proper funding.  A 
recent survey found that, at their current pace, Indian courts would take 320 years to hear their 
existing backlog of cases.
63
 
In addition, the decisions of lower courts often reflect an unwillingness to convict and 
imprison abusers.  In one recent case, a trial court judge acquitted a man of domestic abuse under 
section 498A of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of a supposed dying declaration of the victim 
exonerating her husband from all charges.
64
  The trial court gave weight to this ―dying 
declaration‖ despite the fact that the prosecution at trial produced eight witnesses who testified to 
the abuse of the victim.
65
 
In another case, the High Court of Allahabad reduced the sentence of abusers who had 
mercilessly beat a victim with a wooden stick and planned to burn her alive to a small fine of RS 
1000 (approximately twenty U.S. dollars), without hearing any evidence or argument as to why 
the sentence should be reduced.
66
  When delivering the judgment, the Indian Supreme Court 
restoring the original jail sentence, Justice Shah noted the repeated problems of getting lower 
courts to enforce domestic violence law: 
                                                          
60 Id. 
61 See Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 647-48 (noting that half-hearted investigations by police often force 
judges to dismiss cases of domestic abuse); Ravikant, supra note 50, at 449, 476-77 (2000) (discussing how police often 
categorize spousal abuse as a ―private affair‖ as a way of refusing to investigate abuse). 
62 AMNESTY INT‘L, supra note 3, at 23 (discussing how ―Uttar Pradesh has no State Women‘s Commission,‖ 
yet ―[in] January 2001 it was reported that the National Commission for Women had directed the Uttar Pradesh 
government to establish a women‘s commission, alarmed at the number of complaints relating to atrocities on women 
received from Uttar Pradesh (the largest number from any state)‖). 
63 Courts Will Take 320 Years to Clear Backlog Cases: Justice Rao, TIMES OF  INDIA, Mar. 6, 2010, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Courts-will-take-320-years-to-clear-backlog-cases-Justice-Rao/articleshow/56517 
82.cms. 
64 The trial court‘s decision was later overturned by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.  See 
Kamalakar Nandram Bhavsar v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 10 S.C.C. 192. 
65 Id. 
66 Narsingh Prasad Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2001) 2 S.C.R. 984. 
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It is virtually a matter of shame to the civilization that indiscriminate attacks 
and violence are directed against married women in certain quarters including 
so-called educated for obnoxious and anti-social demand of dowry and the 
accused are let off for various reasons.  Result is violence against women 
continues unabated as law looses [sic] its deterrent effect.
67
 
A final implementation problem lies in the unreasonably large mandates thrust upon the 
National Human Rights Commission and the National Commission for Women, and the 
comparably few mechanisms given to these organizations to enforce their mandates.  Both 
Commissions have broad mandates to investigate abuse.
68
  But upon finding abuse, all either 
Commission can do is recommend appropriate punitive measures to the appropriate authorities, 
who often ignore the recommendations.
69
  Because of their lack of enforcement power to 
prosecute civil servants, these Commissions act most prominently as investigative bodies.  
Without appropriate enforcement mechanisms, the Commissions will remain ―an exercise in 
empty rhetoric.‖
70
 
B. Cultural and Familial Bias Against Implementing Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation 
Blanket explanations of the lack of enforcement of domestic violence provisions on the 
basis of patriarchal bias tend to exaggerate the coherence of Indian culture and ignore the wide 
range of opinions, rural and urban differences, religious differences, and regional differences that 
influence cultural biases.
71
  In urban areas, for example, both arranged marriages and conceptions 
of the responsibility of a bride to live with her husband‘s family are declining, giving women a 
greater number of familial and marital choices.
72
  Yet while levels of female autonomy vary 
considerably throughout South Asia, basic familial patterns in rural areas, including patrilocal 
residence, arranged marriage, hierarchical familial relations, and property and inheritance 
arrangements that exclude women, are still prevalent.
73
  A bride‘s dependence on her husband‘s 
family in rural areas can be quite substantial, particularly in North India where women tend to 
enter into arranged marriages with a family far from their home village and marry husbands with 
whom they have had infrequent contact .
74
 In these areas, larger dowries are also frequently 
expected, and the social and economic prestige of the husband‘s family is often tied to the 
                                                          
67 Id. 
68 See Sripati, supra note 1, at 37 (describing the agenda of the NHRC whose breadth includes all human 
rights at all levels of government); see also National Commission for Women Act, No. 20 of 1990, INDIA CODE (1990) 
(detailing the charter of the expansive National Commission for Women). 
69 National Commission for Women Act, No. 20 of 1990, § 10(e). 
70 Sripati, supra note 1, at 46. 
71 See Catherine Kohler Riessman, Stigma and Everyday Resistance Practices: Childless Women in South 
India, 14 GENDER & SOC‘Y 111, 112 (2000) (describing how women from different classes experience childlessness 
differently). 
72 See id. (showing how traditional gender roles are being altered by influential feminist organizations in 
India and how urban women can increasingly choose to remain unmarried for longer periods of time or can choose their 
own husband). 
73 See Shireen J. Jeejeebhoy & Zeba A. Sathar, Women’s Autonomy in India and Pakistan: The Influence of 
Religion and Region, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 687, 690 (2001). 
74 See id. 
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continuing success of the marriage.
75
  In particular, despite legal efforts to give women financial 
status, the lack of clear marital property rights still leaves many women who file claims without 
the economic resources to support themselves.
76
  This provides a disincentive for Indian women 
to seek divorces or to cause conflict with their husband‘s families by reporting abuse to 
authorities.
77
 
In rural areas, women are more likely to be tied both economically and by tradition to the 
property owned by their husband‘s family for subsistence.
78
  Women in many areas of India still 
face strong expectations to marry and produce children and to seek divorces rarely.
79
  In these 
situations, women still become victims of their lack of social power within the husband‘s family 
and their own lack of resources and autonomy.
80
  While these factors are not the only explanations 
for the problems of enforcing domestic violence statutes at the local level, these persistent cultural 
biases against women certainly still provide a part of the explanation for local intransigence.  
Thus, as Prem Chowdhry has shown, in rural North India, ―aspects of caste, class, and gender‖ 
often have ―a crucial inter-connection,‖ since kinship linkages, which tend to strengthen caste ties, 
are solidified through the institution of marriage.
81
 
Additionally, local police forces sometimes do not prioritize dowry deaths because of the 
view that the family, rather than the State, is the best forum to resolve the issue.  This cultural 
assumption—that deaths that occur within the family ought to be resolved through informal 
means—results in dowry deaths being given a considerably lower priority than other homicides.  
In certain areas of India, it can often take more than a year for such a case to even be given a 
hearing.
82
 
C. Caste and Economic Status as Impediments to the Enforcement of Domestic Violence 
Laws 
In June 1999, seventeen-year-old Usha Yadav, a caste Hindu, decided to elope with a 
dalit (untouchable caste) boy.
83
  In retaliation for this eloping and unacceptable mixing of castes, 
                                                          
75 Id.; see also Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 649-50 (describing how dowry law continually 
disempowers women). 
76 See Amy Hornbeck et al., The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act: Solution or Mere Paper 
Tiger?, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L L. REV. 273, 303-04 (2006) (describing how the inability of many women to inherit property 
disempowers them). 
77 See id. 
78 See Agarwal, supra note 9, at 42-43 (discussing property rights and inheritance force women to rely on 
husbands). 
79 Riessman, supra note 71, at 113. 
80 See Tim Dyson & Mick Moore, On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy, and Demographic Behavior in 
India, 9 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 35, 45-46 (1983) (discussing women‘s lack of autonomy and reliance on husband‘s 
family). 
81 Prem Chowdhry, Enforcing Cultural Codes: Gender and Violence in Northern India, 32 ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. 1019, 1019 (1997). 
82 Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 648. 
83 The Hindu caste system has its roots in the epic religious texts such as the Bhagavad Gita.  The system 
has five major class designations: Brahmins (priests), ksatriyas (warriors), vaisyas (farmers, merchants, artisans), sudras 
(laborers), and dalits (untouchable laborers).  The dalits are referred to as ―untouchables‖ because they are thought to be 
so polluting that touching them would result in ritual pollution for caste Hindus.  Though in rare cases mobility within 
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the next month, Usha Yadav‘s father detained the boy‘s mother in his house.  She was 
subsequently gang-raped and tortured.  She was then burned alive in front of the entire village of 
Bhavanipur, in Uttar Pradesh state.
84
  Stories like these are unfortunately common because most 
of the victims of caste-based atrocities are women, and many of these atrocities are related to 
episodes of domestic violence.
85
  They are also, unfortunately, not a relic of the past, as honor 
killings for inter-caste marriages remain prevalent.  In Uttar Pradesh in 2010, Ajit Saini was 
burned with acid, had his limbs cut off, and was found dead with his throat slit, apparently by the 
brother of a Jat girl he had married.  More recently, in January 2012, a man strangled his sister 
who had married someone from a different caste against his wishes.
86
 
Economic and caste discrimination play a crucial role in preventing lower-income 
women and women from backward or scheduled classes from obtaining redress for their 
complaints of domestic and spousal abuse.  A recent study that examined the reproductive health 
of 6,695 married men in Uttar Pradesh state has yielded valuable data corroborate the idea that 
persistent domestic violence has a substantial economic component.
87
  Of these men, thirty 
percent reported physically abusing their wives.
88
  Further, among such men, the study found a 
strong correlation between low education levels and abuse, as well as a very strong correlation 
between extreme poverty and spousal abuse.
89
  Recent studies also show that the likelihood of 
abuse increases with the amount of specific economic requests by a wife on her husband (such as 
incurring an expense and asking for money), particularly if the husband is poor, and that the risk 
of domestic violence increases greatly with small dowry payments.
90
  Since grooms‘ families 
view dowry as a crucial way to improve their economic status, brides and families of brides who 
are unable to pay dowries face far greater risks of domestic violence.
91
 
Faced with the increased likelihood of abuse and the dual problems of economic and 
caste discrimination as well as gender discrimination, poor, lower caste, and rural women are 
bereft of the options afforded to urban, higher class, or middle class women.  They are less likely 
to have access to feminist groups and autonomous organizations, since knowledge of these groups 
requires literacy, and the majority of leaders of women‘s groups in India are urban, middle class, 
and highly educated.
92
  Though there are NGOs such as Jagori Rural that work to improve access 
                                                          
subcastes is possible, in general one‘s caste status is fixed.  See Oliver C. Cox, Race and Caste: A Distinction, 50 AM. J. 
SOCIOLOGY 360, 362 (1945).  The rigidity of caste distinctions is in part a result of their usefulness for taking censuses in 
the colonial era.  See Nicholas P. Dirks, Castes of Mind, 37 REPRESENTATIONS 56, 76 (1992) (discussing the ways in 
which the modern form of caste was largely a British invention). 
84 AMNESTY INT‘L, supra note 3, at 10. 
85 Id. at 15. 
86 Dipak Kumar Dash, Inter-Caste Marriage Ends in Honour Killing, TIMES INDIA, May 9, 2010, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-09/india/28319860_1_ajit-saini-anshu-anuj-tomar; Honour Killing: 
Man Murders Newly Married Sister, TIMES INDIA, Jan. 2, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-
02/delhi/30580811_1_man-murders-inter-caste-marriage-honour. 
87 Gerstein, supra note 8, at 45; Sandra L. Martin et al., Domestic Violence in Northern India, 150 AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 417, 418-19 (1999). 
88 Gerstein, supra note 8, at 44. 
89 Id. 
90 See Ravi K. Verma & Martine Collumbien, Wife Beating and the Link with Poor Sexual Health and Risk 
Behavior Among Men in Urban Slums in India, 34 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 61, 61 (2003). 
91 See Greenberg, supra note 28, at 830. 
92 See Leslie J. Calman, Women and Movement Politics in India, 29 ASIAN SURV. 940, 944-45 (1989). 
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to information about violence in rural areas, by their own admission their efforts to make the legal 
system functional in these areas is limited, forcing the organizations into a strategy of direct 
action rather than litigation.
93
  Given their lack of literacy and lack of access to women‘s 
organizations, women of lower caste and lower economic status are less likely to know about 
judicial remedies or take advantage of them. 
Economic status also affects the ability of women to obtain redress for domestic violence 
because of rampant bribery.  Despite laws to combat corruption, bribery is still common in India, 
not least among the police and the judicial system.
94
  Because of widespread corruption and 
bribery in Indian government and society, those of lower economic status have less opportunity to 
effectively use the judicial system.
95
  Women without substantial economic means are unlikely to 
be able to convince authorities to prosecute cases, even when they are able to take their 
complaints to the National Commission on Women, the police, or the courts.  Local police 
officers hesitate to file complaints for lower-class women, and have been known to charge an 
entry fee for coming into a police station and to demand an additional surcharge for filing a 
complaint.
96
  Furthermore, lower-class and lower-status women are less likely to be able to appeal 
their cases.
97
  Even the Indian central government has acknowledged that the lack of aid is a 
substantial factor in seeking relief from domestic violence: 
A large number of women have not been able to fully avail the benefits under 
the Constitution and other legal provisions.  There are several deterrents in the 
way of women seeking legal redress.  Insufficiency of legal aid, procedural 
lacunae and delays, lack of basic knowledge about the law and procedures and 
long drawn out trials continue to hamper women‘s access to legal redress.
98
 
Moreover, this lack of aid, as well as these delays and procedural defects, have not been 
entirely resolved by the passage of PWDVA.  The PWDVA does allow for ―service providers‖–
organizations dedicated to the protection of women that provide legal aid–to be notified when a 
protection officer files a domestic incident report.  However, this vests tremendous authority in 
the protection officers, who are neither officially trained personnel nor judicial officers, and 
creates the potential for ―ineffectiveness or worse yet the abuse of the machinery in case a 
protection officer either neglects his or her responsibility or misuses his or her authority.‖
99
  
Similarly, though the PWDVA was supposed to mandate that cases be handled quickly, delays 
continue to plague the system, as protection and maintenance orders are still not processed 
                                                          
93 Meera Velayudhan, Women’s Land Rights in South Asia: Struggles and Diverse Contexts, 44 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. 74, 77 (2009) (describing low membership in women activist groups). 
94 See Meghana Shah, Rights Under Fire: The Inadequacy of International Human Rights Instruments in 
Combating Dowry Murder in India, 19 CONN. J. INT‘L L. 209, 221 (2003) (noting that law enforcement is weak in the 
Indian system because of corruption); see also Toral Patel, Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff, 20 LOY. L.A. INT‘L & 
COMP. L.J. 389, 397-405 (1998) (describing history of corruption in India). 
95 See Editorial, Gail Omvedt, The Purpose of Reservation—II, HINDU, Mar. 25, 2000 (arguing that set-
asides for scheduled and backwards classes are necessary because these classes have less ability to bribe officials). 
96 See P. Sainath, A Dalit Goes to Court, HINDU, July 11, 1999 (describing the difficulties of going through 
the court system); see also AMNESTY INT‘L, supra note 3, at 40. 
97 AMNESTY INT‘L, supra note 3, at 39. 
98 Id. at 19. 
99 Karanjawala & Chugh, supra note 39, at 298. 
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quickly.
100
 
III. INTERSECTIONALITY: THE MARGINALIZATION OF ECONOMICALLY 
DISADVANTAGED WOMEN AND WOMEN OF LOWER CASTE 
Several American legal scholars, including critical race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw, are 
credited with espousing the theory of intersectionality and its impact on women of color.
101
  
Crenshaw claims that experiences of discrimination are dependent upon an understanding of 
individuals as being comprised of multifaceted identities.
102
  For instance, she argues that for 
women of color in the United States, the intersection of race and gender creates a greater feeling 
of disempowerment than that of men of color or white women, both of whom are also 
marginalized groups.
103
  The political climate of the United States in the twentieth century 
resulted in the creation of two very distinct sociopolitical groups that were created to account for 
the interests of their members who were, and still are, political minorities and often victims of 
social discrimination.  The first group, whose members identify as women, primarily accounts for 
the interests of upper class white women rather than women of color.
104
  The second group, whose 
members identify as of a particular race or color, primarily accounts for the interests of males.
105
  
The result is that women of color, who identify with the interests of both groups, become 
marginalized by both groups, since they only partially account for these women‘s interests.  
Women of color cannot be placed solely into one of the available groups because their interests lie 
with both.
106
  However, both groups often look to the interests of other members first.  Often the 
political ideology of such groups may be conflicting, in which case women of color are torn in 
their interests.  Additionally, understanding the position of women of color in the United States 
can help explain their unique experience of violence and discrimination.
107
 
                                                          
100 See Biswajit Ghosh & Tanima Choudhuri, Legal Protection Against Domestic Violence in India: Scope 
and Limitations, 26 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 319, 327 (2011) (describing the complex and problematic process of obtaining a 
protection order). 
101 See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color (stating that violence against women often requires attention to many dimensions 
including race and gender), in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 357 
(Kimberlé Crenshaw et. al eds., 1996) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins]; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to 
Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 16 (1995); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1989). 
102 See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 101, at 358-59 (analyzing the unique position of 
women of color when facing violence and discrimination). 
103 Id. at 357-58. 
104 Id. at 360; see also Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic 
Exploration of Women’s Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 107 (2003) (―This unified, monolithic category of 
‗women‘ excluded diverse voices and inevitably reflected the position of privileged women—white, upper-middle-class, 
heterosexual, able-bodied women.‖). 
105 see Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 101, at 360 (using the example of African-Americans). 
106 Id. at 358. 
107 See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Panel Presentation on Cultural Battery, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 891, 894 
(1994) (stating that women from minority cultures often find it more difficult to report violence and get protection from 
abuse because of language barriers and discrimination against minority cultures); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
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A. Violence Against Women in India 
The impact of multifaceted identities in understanding violence against women is not 
limited to the United States.
108
  In India, issues of caste, gender and class create barriers for 
protecting poorer women from domestic violence.
109
  In her study of India‘s National Human 
Rights Commission, Vijayashri Sripati notes, ―[h]uman rights violations in India are rooted in 
deep schisms based not only on acute economic inequalities, but also caste, creed, religion, 
gender, social status and other characteristics.‖
110
  Poor women and women of low status face an 
especially difficult burden of reporting incidents of domestic violence due to their marginalization 
as both women–where certain forms of domestic violence have been ―widely accepted as an 
integral part of the patriarchal social structure in India, under which women are considered to be 
inferior,‖
111
–and as members of a lower class or caste who often face discrimination from agency 
officials charged with ensuring their protection.
112
 
B. The Effects of Gender in Prosecuting Violence Against Women 
Although the role of women is changing in India over time,
113
 many women are still 
forced into roles of inferiority and submission.
114
  Gender roles are clearly demarcated between 
male and female obligations.  Women are often expected to fulfill the role of wife and mother.
115
  
Although India is not exceptional in its expectation of childbearing, ―women continue to be 
constrained by pronatalism—the ideology of compulsory motherhood.‖
116
  Women are often 
stigmatized when they cannot or choose not to become mothers.
117
 
Furthermore, the Indian family arrangement is such that married women are often 
                                                          
Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 
6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 308 (2001); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, 
Critical Race Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999) (explaining that intersectionality also 
involves the systems of oppression in which social identities are constructed, empowered and disempowered). 
108 See Bond, supra note 104, at 71 (―Ardent identity politics dominate the world stage . . . .‖). 
109 See Paul, supra note 2, at 236-40 (stating that factors such as gender, race and religion play a role in the 
prosecution of, and protection against, violence against women). 
110 Sripati, supra note 1, at 11. 
111 Paul, supra note 2, at 236. 
112 See William J. Eisenman, Comment, Eliminating Discriminatory Traditions Against Dalits: The Local 
Need for International Capacity Building of the Indian Criminal Justice System, 17 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 133, 138 (2003) 
(discussing cases of police unwillingness to take up discrimination against dalits); Sripati, supra note 1, at 11-12 (stating 
that members of religious, linguistic, and ethnic minorities, and the dalits or harijans, untouchables, are often vulnerable 
to unreported violence due to their low status). 
113 See Riessman, supra note 71, at 112-13 (stating that stereotypes about Indian women are based on 
inadequate knowledge and should take into account regional differences as well as the impact of feminist organizations). 
114 See Paul, supra note 2, at 236-37 (stating women in India are often bound by cultural roles of 
―submissiveness, passiveness, and denial‖). 
115 See Riessman, supra note 71, at 112 (stating that women often feel pressure to become married with 
children). 
116 Id. at 129. 
117 Id. 
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expected to live with their husband‘s family.
118
  This extended family structure further serves to 
isolate women from childhood friends and family members that could otherwise serve as a source 
of support in the face of violence.  Women who move a long distance from their childhood homes 
and environments are especially susceptible to feelings of isolation and loss of a support network.  
The internalization of certain patriarchal norms have also created situations ―where the in-laws, 
often the mother-in-law, contribute to violence perpetuated by the husband against the wife‖ as a 
disciplinary measure.
119
 
This family structure is a remnant of the traditional notion of women as the property of 
either their fathers or husbands.
120
  Even now, this notion of the bride as property is prevalent in 
some areas of India where dowries are still expected from the bride‘s family.
121
  When families 
are unable to pay a sufficient dowry, the bride often faces physical assault and retribution.
122
  
Women are especially susceptible to domestic violence where consumerism is one its root causes.  
There are still numerous reports of married women being beaten or killed for insufficient dowry 
by the bride‘s family.
123
  Such crimes are still often hard to prosecute because the crimes are 
staged to look like suicide and the evidence is often burned along with the bride.
124
  Indian law 
has been unable to deal adequately with dowry deaths.  Even after the passage of the PWDVA, 
the rate of convictions in dowry-related crimes remains very low, despite evidence that these 
crimes are actually increasing in frequency.
125
  Therefore, legal protections cannot guarantee 
women‘s safety. 
Additionally, gender roles at times give males a legal advantage in crimes of violence.  
For instance, in the case of TK Gopal @ Gopi v. State of Karnataka, the defendant was charged 
and convicted of brutally raping a one and half-year-old child.
126
  In considering the severity of 
punishment, the appeals court took account of certain mitigating factors presented by the 
defendant.  The defendant pleaded for a less severe sentence because he was the ―sole bread 
earner of his family,‖ which besides his wife included two daughters who were sixteen and ten-
years of age respectively.
127
  The court withheld from giving the defendant a stricter sentence 
because his daughters ―have come of age and are to be married,‖ and the prospects of getting a 
suitable match for the daughters could be marred if the sentence were enhanced.
128
  Therefore, the 
defendant‘s gender role as the male head of the household and responsibility for ensuring that his 
                                                          
118 See Paul, supra note 2, at 238. 
119 Id. 
120 See Carlson-Whitley, supra note 7, at 649-50. 
121 Paul, supra note 2, at 238. 
122 Id. 
123 See Three Convicted for Dowry Death, TIMES INDIA, Jan. 16, 2004; Ramesh Vinayak, The Battle of the 
Baraat Begins, INDIA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2003, at 17 (stating that ―dowry-related incidents account for 47 per cent of crimes 
against women in [the state of] Haryana‖). 
124 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and Presumptions in Indian and 
American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 98 (1999) (stating that prosecutors were rarely able to prove that 
dowry related deaths were the result of a homicide rather than by accident because the acts resulting in death almost 
always occurred in the household of the husband). 
125 See Ghosh & Choudhuri, supra note 100, at 320 (―Cases of cruelty by husbands and other relatives have 
increased dramatically from 50,703 in 2003 to 81,344 in 2008.‖ ). 
126 See T.K. Gopal @ Gopi v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 6 S.C.C. 168, 2-3 (India). 
127 Id. at 4. 
128 Id. at 7. 
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daughters were properly wed served as sufficient bases for getting a mitigated sentence.  
Ironically, it is because the male gender role is one of superiority that the family was dependent 
on the father in the first place.  This case illustrates that roles of gender superiority create avenues 
of legal advantage whereas those in inferior gender roles are left without legal protection. 
C. Social Hierarchy: The Effects of Class and Caste on Violence Against Women 
Victims of violence face numerous obstacles in a community where concepts of 
patriarchy, caste, community and honor have a direct impact on the discrimination perpetrated at 
the local level and contribute directly to a situation of impunity for perpetrators.
129
  Although the 
Indian Constitution was written as a secular doctrine, the realities of local practice often reflect 
traditional religious beliefs.  For example, the caste system that was incorporated from Hindu 
principles created among its categories the lowest class of individuals, known as dalits or 
―untouchables.‖  Although the Indian government has passed legislation outlawing discrimination 
against untouchables, incidents of violence persist.
130
  This systematic discrimination remains 
despite what seems to be a legal commitment to redressing these wrongs, including a wide-
ranging system giving reservations for seats for government jobs and at public schools based on 
race or caste status.
131
 
Lowest class dalits have been historically excluded from meaningful employment 
opportunities, land ownership, and political participation, making disincentives to complain about 
domestic violence even more severe for most economically disadvantaged.  In addition, domestic 
violence against dalit women often results from marrying out of caste.  The most prevalent 
incidents include cases of violence against the dalit and their family when caste background was 
discovered.
132
 
Caste mobility has been increasing in recent years, particularly in North India.  However, 
even when the class mobility of dalits increases, this mixing of classes results in increased gender 
violence.  In one particularly popularized case, an entire community of dalits in Haryana was 
blamed for the ―abduction‖ of two jat (landholding caste) women, resulting in threats of rape, 
violence against the dalit community, and suicide.  After an investigation, it became clear that 
there was no abduction but rather an elopement between a jat woman and a dalit man, 
accompanied by another jat woman who was their friend.
133
 
Similarly, as increased development and rising standards of living make economic 
mobility increasingly possible in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, khap panchayats (gangs of men who 
use violence to enforce existing caste lines) are increasingly in operation because of the rise of 
inter-caste marriage.  Khap panchayats consider it imperative to commit ―honour killings‖ in 
                                                          
129 See AMNESTY INT‘L, supra note 3. 
130 The Act, formerly called the Untouchability Offences Act, employs criminal penalties for certain acts of 
discrimination against dalits.  See Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, No. 22 Acts of Parliament, 1955 (amended 1976); 
see also Krieger, supra note 124, at 95-96 (describing elements of the Protection of Civil Rights Act). 
131 See Evan Osborne, Culture, Development, and Government: Reservations in India.  49 ECON. DEV. & 
CULTURAL CHANGE 659, 681 (2001) (finding that ―the pattern of steadily increasing ethnicity- and caste-based violence 
from 1961 to the early 1990s,‖ despite, or even due to, government reservations). 
132 See Violation of Rights, HINDU, Feb. 24, 1999. 
133 Uma Chakravarti, From Fathers to Husbands: Of Love, Marriage, and Death in North India, in 
HONOUR: CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 308, 312-13 (Sara Hussein & Lynn Welchman eds., 
2007). 
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order to deter inter-caste marriage and to prevent marriage-by-choice.
134
  Because of the flood of 
cases caused by khap panchayat violence, the ability of the courts to intervene and prevent the 
violence is limited.
135
 
Additionally, ―despite the Indian‘s constitutional goal of socialism, extreme disparities 
exist between the advantaged and the disadvantaged.‖
136
  Because economically disadvantaged 
women are more likely to depend on their husbands for economic survival and status, there are 
greater disincentives to apply for the protection of the law.  The class background of 
disadvantaged women also prevents access to education, a major factor in being aware of the 
potential de jure remedies available to them.  Thus, the issue of domestic violence in India must 
be understood in terms of the disproportionate effects of class background. 
A study of married women of different classes revealed differences in the effects and 
impacts of stigma on women of varying class backgrounds.
137
  In her study, Catherine Riessman 
conducted and analyzed interviews of married women who did not have children.  Because 
married women in South India are ―defined and judged in relation to dominant family forms and 
associated gender ideologies,‖ women who either cannot or choose not to have children often face 
social stigmas.
138
  Riessman found that poor women experience shame and distress by 
internalizing the stigma of infertility, whereas the middle class women did not stigmatize 
themselves and also had support from other middle class women.
139
  The internalization of blame, 
which affects women of all classes, can be ―avoided by women with educational and occupational 
leverage.‖
140
  Class affects not only the legal channels that women choose to pursue, but also the 
likelihood that they will seek protection in the first place.  An increased internalization of blame 
for acts that come with a social stigmatization will result in victims of domestic violence silently 
enduring the abuse. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Though cultural bias against women in India remains an important factor in the lack of 
enforcement of laws relating to domestic violence and dowry deaths, legal scholars also need to 
emphasize the self-reinforcing and intersecting dynamics of caste, class, and gender in producing 
violence against women.  While India‘s laws against domestic violence are generally under-
enforced, the problem is exacerbated among the poorest and lowest caste women who do not have 
access to organizational support, education, or legal remedies.  Because India‘s Commissions and 
organizations have both an urban and elite bias, India‘s legal and non-governmental remedies 
often attempt to change cultural conceptions about women while ignoring the geographical, caste, 
and class roots of the problem.  Thus, the explanation for the failure of Indian laws to address 
adequately the problem of spousal abuse must come not only from its failure to change cultural 
                                                          
134 See Jagmati Sangwan, Khap Panchayat: Signs of Desperation?, HINDU, May 7, 2010, http://www. 
thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article424506.ece. 
135 Id. 
136 Paul, supra note 2, at 237. 
137 See Riessman, supra note 71, at 115 (discussing the diverse reactions of childless women to the 
comments made by their social peers in regard to the stigma of being married woman without children). 
138 Id. at 128-29 (discussing social isolation experienced by brides for not continuing the family name or 
producing heirs). 
139 Id. at 120. 
140 Id. 
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attitudes.  In order for these laws to be effective, they must also address the prevalent problem 
that lower-class, out-casted, and rural women are regularly denied or lack access to the legal 
remedies that should, in theory, be available to them. 
By a being signatory to CEDAW, India is bound by international law to investigate and 
punish abuses against women even when the State is not responsible for them. India‘s solution has 
been to set up agency structures, which are only accessible to a small number of elites. Setting up 
investigative boards centered on major cities have not been, and are unlikely to be, effective in 
rural areas or effective in the context of lower class/caste cases of violence. 
In order to be consistent with the mandates of international human rights law more 
generally, India is obligated to ensure the equal protection of all women.  However, in order to 
account successfully for a large majority of women, India must account for the intersectional 
needs of women from poorer backgrounds and lower classes that face poor local enforcement 
mechanisms.  A statistical correspondence exists between areas of impoverishment of women and 
areas of greatest occurrence of domestic violence.  Given the clear statistical and social 
relationship between caste, class, and domestic violence, scholars should consider the importance 
of this correspondence and be sensitive to intersection of gender and class discrimination in India.  
Instead of relying on blanket explanations of ―Indian culture‖ as the motivating factor for 
domestic violence and the reason for non-implementation of domestic violence law, a more 
nuanced intersectional approach allows us to see the importance of resources and economic status 
in the enforcement of domestic violence statutes. 
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